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Public Interest Litigants in the Court of Session 
 
 
When Lords Hope and Reed reformed the law of standing in AXA General Insurance v Lord 
Advocate1 they grounded that change firmly in constitutional principle. To restrict standing to 
those for whom a SULYDWHULJKWRULQWHUHVWLVDWVWDNHZDVLQ/RUG5HHG¶VYLHZ³LQFRPSDWLEOH
ZLWKWKHFRXUWV¶IXQFWLRQRISUHVHUYLQJWKHUXOHRIODZ´ precisely because ³>D@SXEOLF
DXWKRULW\FDQYLRODWHWKHUXOHRIODZZLWKRXWLQIULQJLQJWKHULJKWVRIDQ\LQGLYLGXDO´2 Thus, 
their Lordships agreed that (in public law judicial review cases at least) the time had come to 
consign the title and interest test to the dustbin. For Lord Reed, drawing a direct parallel with 
the approach taken in England and Wales, the correct terminology must now be standing, 
based on sufficient interest.3 For Lord Hope, WKHZRUGV³GLUHFWO\DIIHFWHG´FRQVWUXHGEURDGO\
to include those acting with genuine concern for the public interest even in the absence of any 
private right or interest of their own, was appropriate.4 A difference of terminology aside, it is 
clear that in terms of the substantive effect of this change the Scottish justices were as one: 
judicial review in Scotland would no longer be about private rights and individual grievances 
but (to borrow from Sedley J) about public wrongs and the maintenance of the rule of law.5 It 
would seem, however, that the Court of Session has so far pushed back against the public 
interest justification for judicial review that underpins this shift, restricting opportunities for 
public interest litigants to appear either as petitioners or as public-spirited interveners. This 
article seeks to explain that claim.         
 
 
A. STANDING 
 
The lines of resistance were first drawn by the Court of Session in Walton v Scottish 
Ministers,6 a statutory appeal7 in which Mr Walton sought to challenge the validity of certain 
                                                          
1 [2011] UKSC 46; 2012 SC (UKSC) 122 at paras 53-56 per Lord Hope; at paras 155-175 per 
Lord Reed.  
2 AXA at para 169. 
3 Para 171. 
4 Para 63. 
5 R v Somerset County Council ex p Dickson [1998] Env LR 111 at 7 per Sedley J.  
6 [2012] CSIH 19. 
7 Roads (Scotland) Act 1984, Sch 2 para 2. 
orders and schemes made by the Scottish Ministers relating to the construction of a new road 
network on the periphery of Aberdeen. In determining whether he was (in the language of the 
UHOHYDQWVWDWXWHD³SHUVRQDJJULHYHG´DQGWKHUHIRUHHQWLWOHGWRUDLVHSURFHHGLQJVWKH,QQHU
House held that Mr Walton had failed to demonstrate that the construction of the road had 
any substantial impact upon his interests, or would negatively affect his property. Moreover, 
the opinion went on to add that, had this been an exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction and 
not a statutory appeal, the court would have been minded to hold that Mr Walton lacked 
³VXIILFLHQWLQWHUHVW´DWFRPPRQODZQRWOHDVWEHFDXVHRIWKHFRQVLGHUDEOHgeographical 
distance between his property and the new route. If the QDUURZLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI0U:DOWRQ¶V
interests here looked like a subtle attempt to reintroduce the restrictions of the title and 
interest test under the guise of sufficient interest (the emphasis being placed on his rights, his 
interests), it was an attempt to which the Supreme Court, on appeal, gave short shrift.8 
'HVSLWHWKHIDFWWKDW0U:DOWRQ¶VHQWLWOHPHQWWREULQJSURFHHGLQJVKDGQRWEHHQFRQWHVWHGE\
the Scottish Ministers, Lord Reed took the opportunity to reinforce the spirit and the 
implications of AXA. In pointed disagreement with the Inner House, his Lordship concluded 
that Mr Walton ± who had demonstrated a genuine concern about the proposal, and who had 
been an active member in organisations concerned with the environment generally and with 
opposition to new route specifically ± ought to have had standing as a party with a sufficient 
interest, though those proceedings would likely have failed on their merits. TKHFRXUW¶V
constitutional function of maintaining the rule of law, he said, could no longer be ignored in 
IDYRXURI³DQDSSURDFKZKLFKSUHVXSSRVHGWKDWWKHFRXUW¶Vsupervisory jurisdiction was to 
redress LQGLYLGXDOJULHYDQFHV´9  
 That a proper interpretation of AXA and Walton required the Court of Session to take 
a qualitatively different approach to standing can be seen in the contrasting treatment given to 
that issue by the Outer and Inner Houses in McGinty v Scottish Ministers.10 Marco McGinty, 
a keen birdwatcher and member of the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (³RSPB´), 
sought to challenge the designation of a new power station and transhipment hub at 
Hunterston DVD³QDWLRQDOGHYHORSPHQW´, thereby giving it priority in any subsequent 
application for development consent, on the basis that statutory requirements for public 
consultation prior to designation were not complied with. In the Outer House, Lord Brailsford 
                                                          
8 Walton v Scottish Ministers [2012] UKSC 44; 2013 SC (UKSC) 67 KHQFHIRUWK³Walton 
(SC)´ 
9 Walton (SC) at para 90. 
10 See respectively McGinty v Scottish Ministers ³McGinty (OH)´>@&62+DQG 
McGinty v Scottish Ministers ³McGinty (IH)´[2013] CSIH 78. 
declined to delay his opinion until the 6XSUHPH&RXUW¶V judgment in AXA had been handed 
down, and ± applying the test of title and interest ± dismissed the petition. Whilst the Lord 
Ordinary took the view that Mr McGinty might have had title to sue in order WR³SUHYHQWD
breach by a public body of a duty owed to the public by that body´,11 as an individual who 
resided some five miles from the land in question, and whose only connection to that land 
was to use it infrequently for recreational purposes, his Lordship concluded that Mr McGinty 
could not be said to have had D³UHDODQGOHJLWLPDWH´RU³UHDODQGSUDFWLFDO´LQWHUHVW in the 
matter, capable of enforcement by the court.12 Following the 6XSUHPH&RXUW¶Vdecisions in 
AXA and in Walton, however, when the petition was reclaimed to the Inner House that court 
felt bound to adopt a different approach. Agreeing with Lord Reed that the rule of law would 
not be maintained if, because everyone was equally affected by an unlawful act, no-one was 
able to challenge it,13 Lord Brodie held that, (although ultimately unsuccessful on the merits) 
³DSSO\LQJWKHDSSURDFKQRZGHVLGHUDWHGE\WKH6XSUHPH&RXUW´LWZDVQRORQJHUSHUPLVVLEOH
to dismiss Mr McGinty as a mere busybody.14 His Lordship considered as relevant the 
SHWLWLRQHU¶VFRQFHUQIRUWKHHQYLURQPHQWDQGIRUWKHDFWLYLW\RIELUGZDWFKLQJKLVNQRZOHGJH
of both; and his willingness to make representations during any consultation process that 
preceded the decision.15      
We should not, however, rush to the conclusion that McGinty marks the last word on 
the question of standing or the final acceptance (or, acceptance finally) by the Court of 
Session of the liberal approach envisaged in AXA and in Walton. Whereas in England and 
Wales it is extremely rare for applicants to fail to clear the hurdle of sufficient interest, in 
Scotland the question of standing remains a substantial (if reduced) obstacle. So, in Christian 
Institute v Lord Advocate16 Lord Pentland appeared to construe QDUURZO\WKH³GLUHFWO\
DIIHFWHG´ test when he refused standing to four of seven petitioners, holding that a failure by 
the Christian Institute, the Family Education Trust and the Young ME Sufferers Trust to 
engage in the consultation exercise which preceded the Children and Young People 
(Scotland) Act 2014, and the general and insubstantial response to that consultation made by 
CARE, betrayed a lack of genuine concern for the legislation and its effects.17 Additionally, 
                                                          
11 McGinty (OH) at para 25 per Lord Braislford. 
12 Para 26. 
13 McGinty (IH) at para 46. 
14 Para 48. 
15 Para 48. 
16 [2015] CSOH 7. 
17 Para 93. 
the Lord Ordinary took the view that none of these organisations possessed sufficient 
expertise to be deemed properly representative of the public or a section thereof who might 
be said to be directly affected by the scheme, adding that the rule of law would not be 
compromised in this case as the competence of the legislation would be tested by three more 
petitioners, whose children it would impact directly.18 In both McGinty and Christian 
Institute we see AXA and Walton applied in ways which lower the threshold of standing but 
which, by requiring public interest litigants to be fully engaged in prior political processes 
and to be possessed of expertise in lieu of enforceable legal rights, nevertheless impose a 
more substantial barrier to litigation than might be placed before their counterparts in 
England and Wales. It is an approach which still focuses too heavily on the characteristics of 
the petitioner rather than the public interest in hearing the petition. 
 
 
B. THIRD PARTY INTERVENTIONS 
 
The Court of Session has taken a similarly resistant approach to the question of third party 
interventions brought in the public interest. In England and Wales, and in the Supreme Court, 
such interventions occur frequently and have been praised (though, it must be said, not 
universally so19) by academics,20 practitioners,21 interveners themselves22 and, crucially, by 
judges23 for the value that they add to proceedings. As Lord Hoffmann put it in E (A Child) v 
Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary,24 so long as they avoid the mere repetition 
of arguments made already by the parties,25 SHUPLVVLRQLVJUDQWHGWRLQWHUYHQHUV³LQWKH
expectation that their fund of knowledge or particular point of view will enable them to 
                                                          
18 Para 95. 
19 C Harlow and R Rawlings, Pressure Through Law (1992).  
20 S Shah, T Poole and M Blackwell, ³5LJKWVLQWHUYHQHUVDQGWKH/DZ/RUGV´
OJLS 295; L 1HXGRUI³,QWHUYHQWLRQDWWKH8.6XSUHPH&RXUW´ Cambridge Journal 
of International and Comparative Law 16.  
21 M Fordham 4&³3XEOLFLQWHUHVWLQWHUYHQWLRQVLQ WKH6XSUHPH&RXUW´ Judicial 
Review 18. 
22 JUSTICE, To Assist the Court: Third Party Interventions in the UK (2009), available at 
http://justice.org.uk/assist-court/.  
23 %DURQHVV+DOH³:KRJXDUGV WKHJXDUGLDQV"´-XGLFLDO5HYLHZ 1. 
24 [2008] UKHL 66. 
25 Para 2. 
provide the [court] with a more rounded picture [of law, policy, fact or context] than it would 
otherwise obtain.´26  
In Scotland, however, public interest interventions are viewed with some scepticism. 
The procedure for public interest interventions appears in rule 58.8A of the Rules of Court. 
Since its introduction in 2000, there is only one reported instance of this procedure being 
used successfully. In Scotch Whisky Association, Petitioner27Lord Hodge allowed a charity, 
Alcohol Focus Scotland (³AFS´), to intervene in a challenge to the validity of the Alcohol 
(Minimum Unit Pricing) (Scotland) Act 2012, recognising that the challenge raised a matter 
of public interest (alcohol abuse and associated harm); that the intervention would neither 
unduly delay the hearing nor increase the costs thereof; that the analysis put by AFS in 
support of the contested policy was distinct from that being made by the Scottish Ministers; 
and that the intervention would therefore be of benefit to the court.  
Subsequently, however, the record has been much bleaker. AFS themselves were 
refused permission to intervene by way of a 5000 word written submission when the petition 
was reclaimed to the Inner House.28 There, in a short (and rather blunt) opinion, Lord Eassie 
took the view that the point of European law upon which AFS sought to intervene had been 
heard but even had this not been so, the intervention would add nothing of substance to the 
arguments put by the parties. This seems questionable, however, not only in light of the 
preliminary reference made by the Inner House, which would allow two further opportunities 
to make substantive arguments (in Luxemburg, and again in Scotland applying the reference) 
but also in light of the minute of intervention, which introduced an argument about 
subsidiarity, and which sought to develop an argument about the role of the precautionary 
principle in the proportionality analysis, neither of which were dealt with in the Lord 
Ordinary's first instance decision.29 Furthermore, Lord Eassie took the view that AFS had 
sought to intervene primarily in the erroneous belief that they would (or could) by virtue of 
that interventLRQEHJUDQWHGWKHVWDWXVRID³SDUW\´ to the proceedings, thus enabling the 
applicants to secure locus standi to make written and oral arguments on the issue before the 
Court of Justice of the EU (³CJEU´).30 Contrast this approach, however, with that taken in 
the High Court in R (on the application of Philip Moris Brands Sarl) v Secretary of State for 
                                                          
26 Para 1. 
27 [2012] CSOH 156. 
28 Alcohol Focus Scotland, Applicants [2014] CSIH 64 KHQFHIRUWK³AFS (IH)´.  
29 On file with author, use permitted by AFS. 
30 AFS (IH) at paras 3-5. 
Health.31 There Turner J held that, although not automatically a party to proceedings as a 
result of having been granted permission to intervene, the expertise and perspectives offered 
by a number of interveners was sufficient to persuade the court to amend a preliminary 
reference to include those organisations to be listed as parties, thereby granting to them an 
opportunity to make submissions to the CJEU.32              
Perhaps more surprising still, in Sustainable Shetland v Scottish Ministers33 the court 
needed just a single paragraph to hold that the RSPB was not entitled to intervene in a 
reclaiming motion to the Inner House against a decision by the Scottish Ministers to grant 
consent for a wind farm in Shetland, with (the petitioner claimed) harmful effects on a rare 
bird species.34 In the /RUG-XVWLFH&OHUN¶V view, the 563%¶Vinterest in the dispute had been 
recognised at the earliest stages when that body was consulted by the Scottish Ministers and 
made its objections to the development known. Had the RSPB wished subsequently to 
challenge the decision to grant consent, his Lordship continued, it had ample opportunity to 
do so either as a petitioner raising an action for judicial review in its own name, or by 
intervening in the Outer House. Thus, the court concluded that it would be ³>LQ@DSSURSULDWHWR
allow them to enter the process at the appellate stage under the guise of a public interest 
LQWHUYHQWLRQ´35 Given, however, that the Court of Session has no mechanism to flag up cases 
that might be of interest to interveners (compare the Court of 6HVVLRQ¶V website  with the 
6XSUHPH&RXUW¶Vmuch more informative and transparent one); given the costs and the risks 
which attach to intervention at an early stage, and the extent to which arguments might (and 
oftentimes do) evolve (to the greater or lesser interest of the potential intervener) as a case 
progresses to the appellate stage; given finally that interveners depend to a large extent on the 
goodwill of the parties disclosing case documents in order to self-assess the value of their 
mooted contribution (goodwill that is not always forthcoming), this seems an unnecessarily 
restrictive approach to take to a body with undoubted expertise whose aim it was to assist the 
court by way of a relatively modest written intervention. In adopting so restrictive an 
                                                          
31 [2014] EWHC 3669 (Admin). 
32 Paras 25-29. 
33 [2013] CSIH 116. 
34 The Supreme Court dismissed Sustainable Shetland¶VDSSHDOLQ)HEUXDU\WKLV\HDUVHH 
[2015] UKSC 4. 
35 Sustainable Shetland (n 33) at para 22. 
approach, the Court of Session is out of kilter with senior courts both within and outwith the 
UK.36                 
 
 
C. CONCLUSION 
 
The Court of Session is frequently in public law cases a final court and, in devolved areas, 
possesses some of the characteristics of a constitutional court. Seen in this context, the 
judgments by the Supreme Court in AXA and in Walton ought rightly to be praised for 
shifting the underlying justification for judicial review in Scotland away from the redress of 
individual grievances towards the public interest in maintaining the rule of law. For would be 
public interest litigants, however, the reluctance with which the Court of Session has 
followed that pivot presents barriers (whether structural, procedural, principled or something 
less tangible still) that remain to be confronted and overcome in processes of dialogue 
between the Court of Session and counsel on the one hand and the Supreme Court on the 
other.  
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36 See Neudorf (n 20); R Chateris, ³,QWHUYHQWLRQ± in tKHSXEOLFLQWHUHVW"´6/71ews) 
87. 
